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Abstract. Research in Privacy Enhancing Technologies has a tradition
of about 25 years. The basic technologies and ideas were found until 1995
while the last decade was dominated by the utilisation of such technolo-
gies. The question arises if there is a market for Privacy Enhanced Tech-
nology. The answer is yes, however Privacy Enhancing Technology may
not have been broadly known yet in order to make it profitable. The gov-
ernments or non-profit organisations must therefore run such systems or
at least promote their further development and deployment. Especially
governments have however conflicting interests: While governments of
democratic nations are responsible to keep the freedom of citizens (and
privacy as a part of it), governments also need instruments to prose-
cute criminal activities. Subsequently, Privacy Enhancing Technologies
have to consider law enforcement functionality in order to balance these
different targets.
1 Introduction
Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET) enables the user of communication sys-
tems to protect himself or herself from being traced his or her activities and
behaviour. PET addresses confidentiality aspects:
– Anonymity of a sender or recipient (hiding the identity of a user),
– Unobservability of communication relations (hiding who is communicating
with whom) or
– generally the unlinkability of actions (events).
The terminology and attacker models mostly used in PET are described in [1].
John Borking can be considered as the creator of the term “Privacy Enhancing
Technology (PET)” when he invented the Identity Protector [2].
Encryption (or cryptography in general and public-key encryption in par-
ticular) can be understood as a basic building block for PET systems. Other
building blocks are dummy traffic and broadcasting:
– Sending random bits at every time interval hides when a meaningful en-
crypted message is sent.
– Sending every encrypted message to everybody hides which message a re-
ceiver is interested in and who is the intended recipient.
Table 1. Timeline of the development of modern PET
Year Idea / PET system
1978 Public-key encryption [3]
1981 MIX, Pseudonyms [4]
1983 Blind signature schemes [5]
1985 Credentials [6]
1988 DC network [7]
1990 Privacy preserving value exchange [8]
1991 ISDN-Mixes [9]
1995 Blind message service [10]
1995 Mixmaster [11]
1996 MIXes in mobile communications [12]
1996 Onion Routing [13]
1997 Crowds Anonymizer [14]
1998 Stop-and-Go (SG) Mixes introduced [15]
1999 Zeroknowledge Freedom Anonymizer (service meanwhile closed)
2000 AN.ON/JAP Anonymizer [16]
2004 TOR [17]
The timeline of development of modern PET systems has its beginning in 1981
when Chaum published his paper “Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Ad-
dresses and Digital Pseudonyms” [4]. From this time Chaum published further
striking ideas (see Table 1) every two or three years for about a decade. Based
on Chaum’s new building blocks (MIX, blind signatures, credentials, DC net-
work) the field has become broader and moved towards research in applications
of Privacy Enhancing Technologies.
2 Methods
Since 2000 the research community on PET systems has its own Workshop on
Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET 20xx ). Another related conference is the
Workshop on Information Hiding (IH). Technical descriptions of new ideas in
PET can mostly be found in the PET- and IH-Workshop-Proceedings.
2.1 Building blocks
As usual in the development of security systems a lot in PET systems is about
trust. Most privacy enhanced systems should fulfil strong requirements, such as:
– no trust into the network operator, and
– no trust into one centralised station.
When reading “new” ideas on PET systems many young researchers in the field
firstly think of a trusted third party to protect the privacy (or more general
the security) of someone. However, almost everything can be protected by a
trustworthy third station. For example, hiding communication relations is easy
if an intermediate station (proxy) is used. However, the communication parties
must trust this proxy. The idea of strong PET systems is to avoid this kind of
trust: Users should not feel compelled to trust the network operator, nor one
single station.
The most important methods and building blocks for PET systems are
– for privacy preserving communication systems (e.g. anonymous communica-
tion):
• Chaumian MIXes [4] and their descendants Mixmaster [11] and SG-
Mixes [15],
• DC networks [7], and
• Blind-message service [10],
– for privacy preserving transactions (e.g. anonymous payment, identity man-
agement):
• Blind signatures [5], and
• Credentials [6].
2.2 Example: MIXes
From a practical point of view the MIX concept is the best-known and mostly
used. MIXes [4] realise the unlinkability of the sender and recipient of a message.
A MIX works as an intermediate station (similar to a proxy). However, by send-
ing a message through more than one MIX the users need not trust one station.
It is clear that the attacker is not allowed to control all MIXes of a chain: At
least one MIX operator must be trustworthy – no matter who.
A MIX collects a number of messages of equal lengths from many distinct
senders, discards repeats, changes their encoding, and forwards the messages to a
successor-MIX in a different order. The last MIX in the chain sends the message
to the recipient. Change of encoding of a message can be implemented using
public-key encryption. Since decryption is a deterministic operation, repeats of
messages have to be discarded. Otherwise, the change of encoding does not
prevent tracing messages by traffic analysis.
For a further description and comparison of MIX-types and their attacker models
we suggest reading [18]. A comprehensive bibliography of PET can be found at
[19]. The MIX concept is used for example in Mixmaster [11], JAP [20], and
TOR [21].
3 Market
Is there a market for such systems? First of all we consider privacy as a nat-
ural need of people. Therefore over the last 15 years so-called privacy activists
have been running lots of systems free of charge to the users, e.g. anonymous
remailer systems (anon.penet.fi, Cypherpunk-Remailers, Mixmaster) and World
Wide Web anonymisers (Anonymizer.com, JAP [20], TOR [21]). Some of these
systems are still hard to use: They come just as command line tools, without
graphical user interfaces, with very limited availability and reliability.
In order to make privacy tools useable for a broad mass, developers have to
concentrate on the improvement of user interfaces. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
can be seen as a very good example in terms of dramatically increased usability
from its first versions until now.
Besides availability and reliability issues, the usability of PET systems may
decide whether a system is ready for the market and for commercial use. There-
fore, the well-known MIX-based anonymiser JAP could be a good basis for mar-
ket research because JAP has been designed to fulfil both requirements: security
and usability. See Figure 1 for a screenshot of JAP. [22] gives a short description
of the JAP system architecture.
Fig. 1. Screenshot of JAP
3.1 Willingness to pay for anonymity
The following results are based on the JAP anonymity system and its usage. In
her survey [23] Spiekermann found out that about 3/4 of the users are power
users, and 1/4 are normal or sporadic users (see Table 2): If someone is using an
anonymity system he or she will probably use it heavily.
In [24] similar results are shown – differentiated by European and US users.
Because these numbers represent the users of a system free of charge, people
were asked for their willingness to pay for anonymity services. 60 % of the users
are willing to pay, 40 % are not (see Table 3).
Table 2. Heaviness of usage of anonymity systems
Type of user
73 % heavy users (use an anonymity system at least daily)
10 % protect their privacy at least twice a week
17 % use such systems sporadic (less than twice the week)
An interesting point is that the willingness to pay for anonymity is indepen-
dent of the heaviness of usage [23].
Table 3. Willingness to pay for anonymity services
Charge for anonymity service
40 % not willing to pay
50 % would pay between 2,50 EUR and 5 EUR monthly
10 % willing to pay a monthly charge above 5 EUR
3.2 Anonymised content
Another interesting question is which content or requests people want to anony-
mise. The following analysis has been done with 150 requests randomly picked
from URLs anonymised by the JAP system in June 2005.
About 44 % of the anonymised requests can be categorised as entertainment
(see Table 4). About 18 % of the JAP users stay anonymously when using Web-
based services (search engines, route planners, etc.). E-shops are surprisingly not
approached anonymously. Nearly the same applies for health-portals.
Table 4. Requested content via an anonymity service
Category of content
44 % Entertainment:
33 % erotic, pornography
8 % private homepages, cinema, amusement, ...
3 % games
18 % Services: search engines, route planners, stock quotes, ...
8 % Companies, institutions, universities, ...
8 % Web-based E-mail services (e.g. Hotmail, GMX, ...)
3 % News, newspapers, magazines, sports news
1 % Health information
0 % Shops, markets, ebay, e-commerce, ...
18 % Misc: not reachable, not categorisable
3.3 Regions
Although anonymity services hide the connection between clients (users) and
servers (e.g. web-sites) such systems do not hide who is using an anonymity
service (but of course what the user is looking for). From May–June 2005 the
JAP project has classified the incoming IP addresses according to countries
and regions in order to find out from where the JAP anonymity system is used.
Table 5 shows that JAP is used mainly in Europe and Asia. In America the TOR
system [21] as a comparable system funded by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) will probably attract Americans more than JAP (as a European project).
Another problem for American users could be that the main part of the JAP
servers (MIXes) is currently installed in Europe. Therefore, the connection to
JAP servers might be too slow for Americans.
Table 5. Regions of JAP usage
Region
60 % Europe
27 % Asia
12 % America
1 % Rest of the world
Because JAP is a German project it was clear that a significant proportion of
the users would come from Germany. We furthermore suspected that the project
is sufficiently known in the US to attract users. An analysis of the data brought
to light that a remarkable portion of the users came from the Arab part of the
world. See for example the day-line of 27 May 2005 (Figure 2): During the night-
hours (Central European Time) the largest number of users came from Saudi
Arabia.
Fig. 2. Usage of JAP (day-line)
4 Misuse
Staying anonymous on the Internet may attract criminals.
The JAP project is currently approached 4-5 times per month on average by
law enforcement agencies and private complaints. See Figure 3 for the develop-
ment of inquiries between July 2001 and December 2004. We are pleased that
there is relatively few abuse compared to the 3-4 terabytes of anonymised data
every month by the JAP project.
Fig. 3. Number of inquiries by law enforcement agencies and private complaints
A typical inquiry by law enforcement agencies contains the date and time of
the incident and the IP address of the anonymity service (usually the IP address
of the last MIX), and asks for the IP address assigned to the related user at the
entry point (usually the first MIX) of the anonymity service. Because anonymity
services should provide unlinkability of incoming and outgoing messages no data
exists to answer the inquiry. An observation will only be possible if all MIXes
in the chain log connections. MIXes will however usually not log anything since
logging is equivalent to “self-mutilation”.
Although the number of JAP users grew over the time, the number of in-
quiries did not. We think that this has the following reasons:
– More and more honest people are using JAP. At the beginning of the service
probably criminals were highly attracted. However, the vast majority is using
anonymity services for legal purposes.
– Law enforcement agencies are meanwhile used to the fact that anonymity
services like JAP do not collect any data. As soon as the police is recognising
that JAP has been used, an inquiry would not provide new evidences. The
anonymity service therefore won’t learn about the real dimension of misuse.
German operators of telecommunication systems are obliged by German law
to intercept transmissions if a court is ordering it. This court order can be
issued if and only if the crime is listed in a catalogue of very grave crime types.
In June 2003 the JAP project received such an order.1 Since then the open-
source software of the JAP-MIX servers contains a function for tracking users.
This function has to be activated in all MIXes of a chain if a certain outgoing
(anonymised) message has to be linked to its originator, i.e. sender. To make
this function useful for criminal investigations all MIXes have to receive such a
court order. If the MIXes are spread over the whole world international law is
necessary to oblige the MIX operators.
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